Approximately 35 countries currently possess operational ballistic missiles of various ranges and approximately 25 countries have operational cruise missiles with a range greater than km 90 miles. Some analysts consider cruise missile proliferation to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarily due to their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy.
This report will be updated annually. Russia and China continue to be the only two countries that could conceivably attack the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, but improved relationships with both countries have done a great deal to diminish this threat over past decades. The renewal of dialogue between these two countries in an attempt to settle their disputes by diplomatic means may also help in slowing proliferation as well as preventing their potential use in this region.
The implications of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States has necessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying to stem the development, deployment, and export of missiles. Past Administrations have been characterized as nonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the current Bush Administration is viewed by some as having abandoned traditional nonproliferation for a more action-oriented approach towards missile proliferation.
Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find the right balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if meaningful, long-term progress is to be made. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of Reference Handbook defines a ballistic missile as "a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag" and a cruise missile as "a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea, and land.
With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya's ballistic missile program, many view North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the primary "rogue nation" long-range ballistic missile threat to U. India's and Pakistan's ongoing missile development programs are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are generally viewed in a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United States.
While some believe that missile proliferation can be "rolled back" by some combination of these approaches, others note that both ballistic and cruise missiles have become such an integral part of many countries' national security frameworks, that it is highly unlikely that countries will abandon their programs in deference to U. Foreign ballistic and cruise missiles pose a potential threat to the national security interests of the United States.
While weapons of mass destruction WMD can be delivered by a variety of means including aircraft, artillery, and asymmetric means, it is missile-delivered WMDs that garner the most domestic and international attention. Countries with a WMD missile capability have the potential to influence the actions of other countries in their regions or even countries on another continent and, in some cases, destroy population centers and national infrastructure.
Several other countries have missiles within range of U. A number of countries are attempting to either procure or develop longer-range ballistic missiles to accurately deliver WMDs over great distances and many fear that one day such an attack may be launched against the United States by a regional power or rogue state where stringent political and military controls over these weapons are not exercised.
Estimates of the missile threat to the United States continue to be controversial for a number of reasons. One is that many missile programs have moved underground and can also be hidden in a country's civilian space or aerospace industry, making it much harder for intelligence organizations to track development. Despite numerous recent developments in missile programs world-wide, the Rumsfeld Commission Report continues in to be the open source benchmark for missile proliferation.
While there is still disagreement about the extent of the missile threat, the Bush Administration's unwavering commitment to ballistic missile defense has resulted in the deployment of ballistic missile interceptors at Ft.
Estimates released by the U. Intelligence Community vary little from those issued in the late s by the Rumsfeld Committee. Iran is still assessed as being capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM 2 capable of reaching the United States by 3 although in the National Intelligence Estimate NIE most intelligence agencies believed that this could happen before Likewise, North Korea's ballistic missile development time lines may need to be re-evaluated as new missile programs are apparently underway.
While not posing a direct threat to the United States, the proliferation of shorter range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles has resulted in heightened regional tensions in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between China and Taiwan. Some maintain that the long-range ballistic missile threat has decreased significantly since the Cold War, primarily due to nonproliferation treaties and arrangements.
Others also note the increase in SRBMs - particularly in the to km range - as well an increase in programs that modify existing surface-to-surface unguided rockets with guidance and control sections, which adds a further low-cost SRBM capability. One significant trend is the increasing number of missile production and development facilities. Several other countries, including Germany, Japan, Great Britain, South Africa, and Brazil could produce ballistic missiles but have chosen not to.
When a country has a missile production facility, its ability to produce large quantities of missiles is limited only by its ability to obtain certain critical materials and components. When a country acquires a large number of missiles and launchers, it may be able to launch sustained attacks and to overwhelm missile defense systems.
Production and research facilities also enable these regional powers to enhance the range, accuracy, destructiveness, and missile defense penetration aids of their missiles. Another important factor is that countries with an indigenous missile production capability also avoid export control restrictions when trying to import missiles and missile technology from outside sources.
Finally, once a country produces missiles it can consider exporting them as well as the production technology to still more countries for financial, political, or ideological rewards. North Korea has been exporting missiles and missile production facilities for a number of years, and there is concern that more countries will enter the missile market as suppliers.
Russian and Chinese organizations have been primary sources of missile technology and, in the past, Western firms also have transferred missile technology.
The primary cause for concern with missile proliferation is that missile systems can provide countries an effective vehicle for delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons over long distances. The most worrisome trend is the growing number of countries with both long-range missile and WMD programs. North Korea, Iran, and Israel are suspected to have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as well as a variety of short and medium range missiles.
Over the last several years, nuclear weapons programs have declined in number. South Africa reportedly dismantled the nuclear weapons and missiles that it had developed.
Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also abandoned earlier nuclear weapon programs. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons they inherited from the Soviet Union. Recent revelations about the possibility of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and Iran's revitalized nuclear program could reverse this favorable trend.
Several other countries that have missiles also have chemical weapons, and some have chemical warheads for their missiles. Bulk filled chemical warheads for shorter-range ballistic missiles are considered relatively easy to develop while chemical submunitions are considered somewhat more challenging.
Biological warheads are considered fairly difficult to develop because of the difficulties associated with working with biological agents in terms of their sensitivity to environmental conditions during missile flight and upon dispersal. It has been reported that during the Gulf War, Iraq had missile warheads filled with a variety of nerve agents and others with botulinum toxin and anthrax. Ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads proved to be important weapons of terror when used against cities in the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf War.
The development of advanced conventional warheads, such as cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, and enhanced missile reliability and accuracy will increase the military effectiveness of missiles armed with conventional warheads. The United States has demonstrated the military effectiveness of cruise missiles in several conflicts and a new generation of stealthy, more capable cruise missiles is presently in development in a number of countries.
As missiles and missile production technology have become widely available, the demand for longer-range missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads has increased. Because of their relatively low cost, ability to penetrate defenses, strike deep into an enemy's homeland, and to deliver nuclear or biological weapons that could threaten the survival of an enemy country, missiles have become a delivery system of choice and a symbol of national might for some countries.
As a result, adversarial countries and non-state groups may be more likely to avoid direct conventional military confrontation with the United States. At the same time, several allies and neutral countries are also building missiles and developing WMD to promote their perceived national security interests. Any stigma associated with the possession or use of missiles was significantly reduced by the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan War, the Gulf War, Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, Russian use in its Chechen conflicts, and by U.
In regional wars, missile attacks and artillery fire on civilian population centers have become a standard form of combat, as the use of standoff weapons usually cruise missiles or air-to-surface guided weapons against hostile military units, intelligence centers, terrorist camps, and WMD facilities has become a commonly-accepted U.
About three dozen countries have been publicly identified as having ballistic missiles, and half of those countries are in Asia and the Middle East see Table 1. About 30 of these countries have, or are developing, ballistic missiles that can deliver a kilogram warhead kilometers or further. In addition to these regional powers, which are often discussed as missile proliferators, several Western and Eastern European countries and republics of the former Soviet Union have missiles. International pressures and domestic policy decisions have eliminated certain missile programs in Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, and former Soviet Republics.
The MTCR was designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles UAV capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It is an informal arrangement, not a treaty, consisting of guidelines for transfers of missiles and related technology, and an annex listing items to be controlled.
The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition or development of delivery systems can be delayed and made more difficult and expensive if major producers restrict exports. The MTCR has no independent means to monitor or enforce its guidelines.
Nations adopt the guidelines as national policy and are responsible for restraining their own missile-related transfers. The ICOC, like the MTCR, is not a treaty but instead a set of "fundamental behavioral norms and a framework for cooperation to address missile proliferation. It seeks to achieve transparency by using confidence building measures, such as information transfer on ballistic missile programs.
It also calls for pre-launch notification of ballistic missile flight tests. Unlike the MTCR, the ICOC intends to establish a formal standing organization to collect information and oversee the development of its confidence building measures and information control mechanisms.
Table 1. Missiles by Categories of Range. Note: See the Missile Inventory Appendix at the end of this report for a listing of each missile program by country. Russia's ICBM force - although greatly diminished in size over the years - continues to pose a significant threat to U.
Russia reportedly plans to reduce the number of ICBMs on active duty from at present to by Topol-M SS "Sickle". Russia is phasing in the silo and mobile versions of the Topol-M to replace a variety of older ICBMs -- some of which were developed in the mid to late s.
The Topol-M -- which began development in the late s -- is widely believed to have a maneuverable reentry vehicle -- possibly including countermeasures -- which Russia claims negates U. Bulava SS-N Iskander SS "Stone". The Iskander, which is reportedly currently being brought into frontline service in Russia, was designed to defeat Western ballistic missile defense systems -- particularly the U.
Syria expressed interest in acquiring Iskander-Es from Russia in early 28 but strong protests from Israel -- who was supposedly concerned that the highly accurate and stealthy Iskanders would be used to either destroy or evade Israel's Arrow ballistic missile defense system -- have reportedly kept the acquisition from proceeding as intended.
Conventional Cruise Missiles. Russia has reportedly deployed its first conventional air launched cruise missile. A number of unarmed Kh cruise missiles -- left in the Ukraine after the withdrawal of Russian forces -- were reportedly illicitly transferred to Iran and China.
Some Western analysts believe that more missiles could have been supplied than the 18 acknowledged by the Ukranian government and that North Korea might have also received missiles. Some are concerned that these Khs could be modified into precision guided Khs and that they could be modified to be fired from smaller aircraft -- such as SUs -- which would increase the utility of the missile among nations that do not have large, long- range bomber aircraft.
Chinese military modernization has been called " a threat to the United States" which could conceivably "alter the regional balance of power" in the Pacific. China's ICBMs. China is believed to have a relatively small arsenal of nuclear-armed, liquid propellant 35 ICBMs capable of reaching portions of the United States. China is continuing its development of its DF road-mobile ICBM, a three-stage, solid propellant missile carried inside of a canister on a transporter-launcher vehicle.
Chinese SLBMs. The JL-2's range is estimated to be approximately 12, kilometers and will likely have multiple warheads. Chinese Missiles and Taiwan. Jacoby stated:. There are numerous unclassified estimates of how many ballistic missiles China has arrayed against Taiwan, with many of these estimates originating from Taiwanese government officials. Although virtually all of China's SRBMs are garrisoned opposite Taiwan, they are mobile and can deploy throughout China to take up firing positions to support other regional contingencies.
To learn more about the different types of ICBMs click on the links below. Three different models of the Atlas, the D, E and F were put in the field. Each one was better than its predecessor, but due to the volatile nature of its liquid fuel the Atlas was retired only six year after coming online. Read more. Two versions of the Titan, the I and II were deployed from The Titan held a nine megaton nuclear warhead, making it the most powerful single nuclear weapon in American history.
Titans were finally retired in the mid's due to their high cost and a series of accidents. The Minuteman's solid fuel technology brought about a revolution in missile development. It could be remotely controlled, offered precision accuracy, launched in a matter of moments and was cost effective. It could hold up to ten nuclear warheads which could strike independent targets.
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